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Georgia Local Government Law:
Court Resolution of County
Government Disagreements
by Paul Vignos*
I.

INTRODUCTION

County government regularly involves disagreements between county
commissioners and other county officers. Solutions include arbitration,1
mediation,2 recalls,' regular elections, 4 and courtroom confrontations.5
Enough cases go through the courts to suggest a pattern of judicial
resolution. In reviewing past decisions, one hopes to understand what
the courts offer, how they work, why they decide as they do, and who
they favor. At least, one hopes to reduce potential frustration over court
battles that might be better resolved elsewhere.

* Research Intern, Prosecuting Attorney's Council of Georgia. Yale College (B-A,
1973); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., anticipated 1995). American
Jurisprudence Award for Advanced Library Research 1993. Member, Pike County Board
of Assessors (1988-1992).
1. See, e.g., Mobley v. Polk County, 242 Ga. 798, 801, 251 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1979).
Under a 1967 local law, budget requests by the tax commissioner in Polk County are
subject to arbitration if disapproved by the Board of Commissioners.
2. See, e.g., The Honorable Dorothy T. Beasley, Planningfor the Futureof our Courts,
9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 400 (1993).
3. See O.C.GA. § 21-4-5 to -21 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Mobley, 242 Ga. at 802, 251 S.E.2d at 541. "Indeed, if the elected official
fails to perform his duty, including the duty delegated by him to his employees, he too may
be subject to mandamus. More likely, he may not be re-elected by the voters. Such is our
political process." Id.
5. In a dispute between the sheriff and the county commissioners of Laurens County,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that superior court is the proper place for resolution of
disputes between county commissioners and others. Bussell v. Youngblood, 239 Ga. 553,
556, 238 S.E.2d 89, 92 (1977).
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BACKGROUND ISSUES

A.

The Role of History in Georgia County Government
Historical developments affect today's Georgia county governments as
much as modern law making does. The county offices of sheriff, tax
commissioner, probate judge, clerk of the superior court, treasurer,
coroner, and surveyor are all as old as the state of Georgia. Each office.;
has a role in administering the remote business of state government at
the county level, but not all offices are constitutionally protected.'
Arguably, no county officer performing administrative duties should be
constitutionally protected. Concern for the local balance of power
combined with 200 years of history,' however, prompted specific
protection for the sheriff, tax collector, clerk of the court, and probate
judge.9
When the subcommittee on local government organization met to
consider changes for the Georgia Constitution of 1983, they based
protection of county officers on three concerns: 1) political pressure by

6. The following have been held to be county officers: an ordinary (now probate judge),
Lee v. Byrd, 169 Ga. 622, 151 S.E. 28 (1929); a clerk of the superior court, McGill v.
Simmons, 172 Ga. 127, 157 S.E. 273 (1930); a tax collector, tax receiver, and sheriff,
Truesdal v. Freeney, 186 Ga. 288, 197 S.E. 783 (1938); a county treasurer, Massenburg v.
The Commissioners of Bibb County, 96 Ga. 614, 23 S.E. 998 (1895); a coroner, McBrien v.
Starkweather, 43 Ga. App. 818, 160 S.E. 548 (1931). County officers, having been defined
by the courts, were incorporated into the Georgia Constitution of 1983 except for the
coroner, county surveyor, and treasurer. The coroner was not included because the
committee rewriting the constitution concluded that there was no lobby for coroners in the
general assembly and the constitutional office could be abolished in order to permit
creation of a medical examiner by statute. The surveyor was not included because the
same committee concluded that the office was an anachronism. The treasurer was not
included because the office could already be abolished by the general assembly (OC.G.A.
§ 36-6-1(b) (1992)), and had already been abolished for most counties. See STATE OF
GEORGIA SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 1977-1981, TRANSCRIPTS OF
MEETINGS, COMMITTEE TO REVISE ART. IX, VOL I., SUBCOMOTTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNmENT
ORGANIZATION, REORGANIZATION AND GENERAL CONCERNS, 75-91 (July 23, 1980)
[hereinafter COMMIrEE ON REVISIONI.
7. See COMMIrrEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 65 (July 23, 1980). As one member

of the Committee to Redraft Article IX of the Georgia Constitution asked, "[T]hey're
carrying out legislation, so why should you elevate them to that level in the first place?"
Id. at 64 (comments of Mr. James Burgess).
8. See COMMITrEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 64 (July 23, 1980) (comments of Mr.
Jay Ricketts). The phrase of Justice O.W. Holmes comes to mind: "Upon this point a page
of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921).
9. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, para. 3(a).
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the county officers themselves;" 2) balance of power within the county
system;" and 3) guidance for the court system.' 2 During protracted
debates on whether the county officers needed constitutional protection
from the governing authority, Representative Warren Evans plainly
stated, "I don't want the county commissioners to control all of the
officers in the county. I think there has to be some independence
there." 3 Mr. Merrill Greathouse, president of the Georgia Sheriff's
Association and Sheriff of Upson County, argued for state-set minimum
salaries rather than risk a compensation structure controlled by the
county governing authority. 4 , The chairman finally concluded, "We
have the sense of the committee by majority expression that we do not
want the express power to delegate [control of county officer salaries to
the county governing authority]."" s Constitutional protection was,
therefore, a response to an evolving struggle between officers at the
county level in which the governing authority was winning.
The struggle periodically reaches the Georgia Supreme Court, but
generally the courts adopt a hands-off policy of deference to the county

10.

See generally COMMITTEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 85-91 (July 23, 1980).

Merrill Greathouse, president of the Georgia Sheriffs Association, was a standing member
of the committee and represented the sheriffs' interest in any potential revisions of county
power or salary control. Another standing member, Mr. Mundy, had been clerk of the
superior court in his county.
11. The Georgia Constitution requires a tripartite system of government and a
separation of power. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3 (1983). In Georgia, as in the United
States federal government, the legislative branch makes policy, i.e., writes the basic
guidelines for government, and the executive branch administers the system of law. The
courts resolve any legislative ambiguities. Georgia counties are not part of this tripartite
structure and lack the internal balance it provides. For a discussion of the catharsis by
which the courts finally arrived at this conclusion, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Delegation in
Georgia Local Government Law, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 9 (1970), reprintedin R. PERRY SENTELL,
JR., STuDIES IN GEORGIA LOcAL GOVERNMENT LAW (3d ed. 1977). While it is beyond the

scope of this Article, it is worth considering whether this lack of clear structural balance
at the county level is the underlying cause of budgetary disputes that often arise in the
context of power disagreements among county officials.
12. "You need to authorize the General Assembly to say who county officers are also,
because the court has been a little confused sometimes, just within the last two years
decided county commissioners were county officers." COMmrrTEE ON REVISION, supra note
6, at 62 (July 23, 1980) (comments of Mr. Doug Carlyle).
13. COMMIrrEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 67 (July 23, 1980).
14.

COMMITTEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 82 (Oct. 30, 1980). See also COMMITTEE

ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 26 (Oct. 22, 1980) (comments of Mr. Carlyle). "Tjhe General
Assembly had to set the salaries.., because it had been at the whim of the local governing
authority as to their salary were [sic] on starvation wages in effect, and this change was
made specifically to take the local authorities out of that process of setting the salaries
..." Id.
15.

Id. at 51.
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governing authority. A particularly difficult case involving deference to
the county governing authority found its way to the supreme court in
Grimsley v. Twiggs County." The case developed out of the clerk of the
superior court's perceived need to hire temporary help for two weeks.
The county governing authority disagreed. The clerk secured a letter
from the superior court judge authorizing payment for the services and
hired the help. The governing authority refused payment again. At the
end of the court term, the clerk requested payment a third time, and the
governing authority refused again. 7
The problem raised was that the viability of the courts seemed to
depend on the discretion of the county commissioners. The clerk
attempted to fulfill her statutory duties within the judicial branch of
government. The supreme court sided with the clerk."8 The court
based its finding on the separation-of-power principle implemented in
the general law authorizing county payment of court expenses "upon
certification of the judge of superior court, and without further order."19
The supreme court proclaimed that the courts "stand between the people
and tyranny. They protect the public from the heavy hand of governmental excess ....

The inherent power of the court must be carefully

preserved, but also cautiously used.' 2
This cautionary language saved the case from breaking with an
established line of cases holding that the separation-of-powers doctrine
does not extend to the county level. Feagin v. Freeney2' is typical.
Holding that it was not concerned with expediency, but only with
legality, the supreme court affirmed a line of cases upholding delegations
of legislative salary-fixing powers to administrative offices. 22 Having
first decided that delegation of quasi-legislative power does not violate
the constitutional prohibition against legislative delegation per se, the

16. 249 Ga. 632, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
17. Id. at 632, 292 S.E.2d at 676.
18. Id. at 635, 292 S.E.2d at 678.
19. Id. at 633,292 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3005 (1977) now codified
as O.C.G-.A § 15-6-24 (1994)).
20. Id. at 634, 292 S.E.2d at 677.
21. 192 Ga. 868, 17 S.E.2d 61 (1941).
22. Id. at 873, 17 S.E.2d at 65. Apparently relying on the peculiar Georgia doctrine of
argumentum ab inconvenienti, a doctrine of judicial restraint where long established
customs make the legal consequences of change particularly awkward, the court stated, "A
contemporary exposition of the Constitution, practised and acquiesced under for a period
of years, fixes the construction, and the Court will not shake or control it.' Id. at 872, 17
S.E.2d at 64 (quoting Low v. Commissioners of Pilotage, R.M. Charlt., 302, 316). See R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., "Argumentum ab Inconuenienti," 23 URBAN GEORGIA (Mar. 1982),
reprintedin R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 1615 (1983).
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court considered whether delegation of salary fixing powers triggered the
The immediate
constitutional separation-of-powers prohibition.'
question before the court was whether the Bibb County Board of
Commissioners could set the salary of a municipal court judge of Macon.
The risk to avoid was the power of the county commissioners to reduce
a salary to "such a small sum as will deprive the judge of an adequate
salary and therefore in effect ... to practically abolish the court."'
However, the court relied on the fact that inferior judges were not even
paid until midway through the 19th century.25 That historical fact,
therefore, precluded any real risk that insufficient compensation would
fail to attract officers and vanquish the courts in 1941.2
Feagin v. Freeney continues to be good law as well as Grimsley v.
Tviggs County, but the cautionary character of Grimsley has taken
precedence over the court-as-protector language.' In Cramerv. County
of Spalding,' the supreme court recently affirmed the court's historical
position of a cautionary, hands-off approach to county government.2
The disagreement at issue was between the county commissioners and
the judge of the State Court of Spalding County.'
The judge, misunderstanding Grimsley to authorize hiring and firing
of court staff at his own discretion, appointed an additional judge and
assistant solicitor to deal with an unusually heavy demand for speedy
DUI trials.31 The county commissioners at first refused to honor the
judge's order for temporary help in the crisis. They condoned the

23. 192 Ga. at 870, 17 S.E.2d at 63. "Thelegislative power of the state shall be vested
in a General Assembly which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
GA. CONSr. OF 1983 art. UI, § 1, para. 1. This clause has been held to proscribe any
delegation of legislative powers. See R. Perry Sentell, The Law of Municipal Annexation
in Georgia: Evolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L. REV. 35 (1967); R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., Home
Rule Benefits or Homemade Problems for GeorgiaLocal Government?, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 317
(1968), reprinted in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

(3d ed. 1977).
24. Feagin, 192 Ga. at 873, 17 S.E.2d at 65.
25. Id In civil matters inferior courts are equivalent to present day superior courts,
"inferior in name only.*
26. Id. The phrase of Justice O.W. Holmes comes to mind again: "Upon this point a
page of history is worth a volume of logic.' New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,
349 (1921).
27. See, e.g., McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court of Chatham County, 260 Ga. 315,
316, 392 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1990). In dictum Justice Clarke, writing for the court stated,
"We again speak a word of caution that the inherent power does not give the judicial
branch the right to invade the province of another branch of government." Id.
28. 261 Ga. 570, 409 S.E.2d 30 (1991).
29. Id. at 574, 409 S.E.2d at 34.
30. Id. at 571, 409 S.E.2d at 31.
31. Id. at 570-71, 409 S.E.2d at 32.
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temporary positions only after losing their initial legal challenge and
learning from their legal counsel that the court was statutorily
empowered to make the necessary expenditures. 2 When the crisis was
over and the judge attempted to make the positions permanent, however,
the commissioners returned to court with a stronger case and won.
Regardless of the judge's perceived needs, the supreme court held that
he had usurped powers beyond his authority.' Citing Grimsley, the
court noted that the inherent powers of the court must be exercised with
caution when interfering with county government, and it also noted that
inherent powers do not authorize indefinite appointments and expenditures that are otherwise matters delegated for decision by the general
assembly to the governing authority of each county.'
Judicial caution follows from an understanding that Georgia counties
are essentially creatures of the state. " They deliver the day-to-day
services that are planned, conceived, and defined by the general
assembly. The counties administer general acts to the extent they apply
to local unincorporated communities. As the primary conduit for
delivery of state services and mandates, the county system began simply
as a structure for the administration of state sovereignty and for the
apportionment of local representation in state government.3"
Initially, the administrative arm of the state ended in the hands of
inferior court judges. Eventually, the general assembly removed the
administrative duties of inferior judges and vested them in executive
agents." County governing authorities'S were thus established on a

32. Id. at 571, 409 S.E.2d at 33.
33. Id. at 575, 409 S.E.2d at 35.
34. Judge Cramer violated a local act (1987 Ga. Laws 4527) strictly limiting the
number of judges in Spalding County as well as several general laws pertaining to
temporary judicial assistance. 261 Ga. at 573-74, 409 S.E.2d at 33-34.
35. See MARY A. HEPBURN, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN GEORGIA 17 (2d ed. 1991); Troup
County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 229 Ga. 348,352, 191 S.E.2d 33,36
(1972) (counties are subdivisions of the state); Wood v. Gwinnett County, 243 Ga. 833, 257
S.E.2d 258, 259 (1979) (powers of counties, as creatures of state, strictly construed). See
also COMMITTEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 4 (July 23, 1980) (comment of Mr. R. P.
Sentell, Jr.). "Ifthere is one fundamental cornerstone in local government law, it seems
to me, it is this. Local governments, municipalities and counties are creatures of the
State."
36. ALBERT BERRY SAYE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA, 1732-1945, 36
(1948)..

37. Id. at 173. Following equal rights challenges to Georgia's methods of apportionment, this power has been removed from the county governing authority. O.C.G.A. § 36-522.1(a)(4) (1993) now reads simply "Reserved." See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, reh'g
denied sub nor., Lodge v. Buxton, 459 U.S. 899 (1982).
38. See, e.g., AN ACT TO CREATE A BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ROADS AND REVENUE
IN THE -COUNTY OF HARRIS (1869 Ga. Laws 170) creating Georgia's first governing

1994]

COUNTY GOVERNMENT DISAGREEMENTS

605

4
county-by-county basis in local acts passed by the general assembly. 0
Their power was strictly limited by law,4 ' and they were generally
called commissioners of roads and revenues in recognition of their two
most important priorities: 1) maintenance of the road system basic to
transportation and communication; and 2) supervision of the state tax
system which was, until the twentieth century, primarily a land tax

system dependent on local appraisals, assessments, and collections. In

1968, as their role expanded, the term "commissioners of roads and
revenues" was simplified statewide to the more general term "commissioners."42 At approximately the same time, the centralized general
assembly was placing such a burden on the county structure that it
seemed logical to adopt some form of home rule.
B.

The Home Rule Movement

Home rule is both a political and a legal concept. As a political
concept, it stands for local autonomy based on theories of government
efficiency. As a legal concept, it stands for the method by which power

is allocated between state and local governmental agencies to achieve the
political goal of local autonomy. There are two general models for home

authority, copied in 1870 by Pike County (1870 Ga. Laws 447) in which the enumerated
powers parallel the powers of inferior courts as defined in R.H. CLARK ST AL., THE CODE
OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 76-78 (revised and corrected by David Irwin, Franklin Steam
Printing House 1867).
39. County governing authority means the board of county commissioners, the sole
county commissioner, or the governing authority of a consolidated government. O.C.G.A.
§ 1-3-3(7) (Supp. 1992).
40. See, e.g., AN ACT To AMEND AN ACT CREATING THE OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF
CHEROKEE COUNTY, APPROVED AUGUST 9, 1915 (1915 Ga. Laws 177), as amended,
particularly by an act approved March 21, 1974 (1974 Ga. Laws 2534), so as to abolish the
Board of Commissioners of Cherokee County and re-create the office of Commissioner of
Cherokee County; to provide that all powers, duties and responsibilities formerly vested
in the Board of Commissioners of Cherokee County shall be vested in the Commissioner
of Cherokee County;... (1977 Ga. Laws 3029).
A local act is an act passed by the general assembly which applies only to a county or
city and does not conflict with a general law, which applies statewide. For an interesting
discussion of when local laws become constitutionally prohibited special laws, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., When is a Special Law Unlawfuly Special?, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1167 (1976),
reprintedin R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW at 177
(3d ed. 1977).
41. "It is so well settled as to require no citation of authorities that the powers of
county commissioners are strictly limited by law." Turner v. Johnston,. 183 Ga. 176, 177,
187 S.E. 864, 864 (1936).
42. O.C.G.A. § 36-5-20 (1992).
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rule: 1) Constitutional home rule, "imperium in imperio" (a state within
a state);' and 2) legislative home rule."
Georgia's relatively recent adoption of home rule combines features of
both general models.' A 1966 amendment to the Georgia Constitution
grants broad, self-executing powers to counties;' but they are subject
to prior general law and subsequent modification by the general

43. Constitutional home rule emphasizes local autonomy over central state control. It
first appeared in the Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, § 20, as a way to facilitate the flexible
development of St. Louis. In the leading case of City of St. Louis v. Western Union, 149
U.S. 465 (1893), the Missouri model was challenged as too restrictive of private industry.
At issue was whether or not St. Louis could impose a rental charge on Western Union for
the use of public property. Telegraph poles used by Western Union were installed, and
therefore permanently occupied, in city street right-of-ways. No rental was charged by the
state legislature for similar installations in road right-of-ways across the state. Because
of practical concerns for laissez-faire economics and constitutional concerns about private
industry regulation, the case went all the way to the United States Supreme Court. The
private interests lost and the "imperium in imperio" phrase was coined to express the
fundamental autonomy granted to local government under the constitutional home rule
model. Id. at 468. The Court reasoned that the constitutional power to control the streets
was granted directly by the people of Missouri to the City ofSt. Louis. Id. at 467. As such
it was not delegated by the legislature and not subject to legislative preemption or
interference. The City of St. Louis had plenary control over public areas. It was a "state
within a state." Id. at 468. Cf DeKalb County v. Georgia Power Co., 249 Ga. 704, 705,
292 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1982) (noting that a valid state law precludes counties, but not
municipalities, from charging for public utility rights-of-way).
44. John F. Dillon was one of the Western Union lawyers who argued against the
validity of the Missouri Constitution's broad delegation of power. He favored strit
limitation of all government, especially municipalities. See generallyDILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1911). The legislative home rule model is
that sort of strictly-limited alternative. Based on as-needed, limited grants of power, it
permits some local flexibility but always subject to legislative redefinition, preemption, and
interference. In cases of doubt the delegated powers are strictly construed, by the courts
if necessary, against the local government in favor of private or state interests. See, eg.,
1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 448-50 (5th ed.
1911). Dillon's Rule:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of
the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but
indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence
of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is
denied.
Id. See generally KE. Vanlandingham, MunicipalHome Rule in the United States, 10 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 269 (1968).
45. See generally Ernie Hynds, Home Rule in Georgia, 8 MERCER L. REV. 337 (1957).
46. See GA. CONsT. art. IX, § 2, para. 1 (1976).
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assembly.47 For example, Georgia counties have exclusive zoning
powers to regulate land use4 subject only to procedural requirements
approved by the general assembly. 9 However, Georgia counties may
not regulate the quality of manufactured homes by inspection ordinances. That privilege is preempted by a general law setting statewide
standards for the manufactured homes industry.' - Despite the
constitutional form, Georgia's concept of home rule is therefore in line
with the national trend toward the limitation of local autonomy in favor
of state interests.5 1
The courts are not unmindful of the theories supporting home rule:
participatory democratic republicanism, efficiency through public choice,
pragmatic appreciation of decentralization, division of government labor,
or institutional prioritization of the state legislature's time. 2 However,
none of these theories seems to have risen to a political priority in
Georgia. By the time Georgia first enabled home rule in 1954, the
complexities of American social-political-economic life made unfettered
delegations of power to local governments risky. In place of cerebral
aspirations for progressive government, the "lolly pop theory" of home
rule prevailed."
It combines the sweet taste of victory with the
palliative notion of candy for the baby, and the ultimate reality that lolly
pops are not nutrition. The local governments seem to get what they
want: "home rule!" However, home rule merely pacifies the local

47.

See GA. CoNST. art. IX, § 2, para. l(a)-l(b)

(1976).

48. See Johnston v. Hicks, 225 Ga. 576, 170 S.E.2d 410 (1969).
49. See McClure v. Davidson, 258 Ga. 706, 373 S.E.2d 617 (1988).
50. Clayton County v. Otis Pruitt Homes, Inc., 250 Ga. 505, 299 S.E.2d 721 (1983).
Otis Pruitt Homes successfully challenged a Clayton County home rule ordinance that
authorized restrictive, independent inspection of factory built houses already approved by
a state agency. Id. at 505, 299 S.E.2d at 722.
51. See generally K E. Vanlandingham, MunicipalHome Rule in the UnitedStates, 10
WM. & MARY L. REv. 269 (1968). The same message of generally restrictive court
interpretations is made in the section on home rule in D. MANDELKER ET. AL., STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM, 110-42 (3d ed. 1990). But see contraTerrance
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48
MINN. L. REv. 643 (1964); accord McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563
(1983) and the 1980 unpublished, but accurate, opinion of the Georgia Attorney General
based on relevant case law. Op. Att'y Gen. No. USO-25 (1980). See, e.g., Commissioners
of Wayne County v. Smith, 240 Ga. 540, 242 S.E.2d 47 (1978), affg DeKalb County v.
Atlanta Gas Light Co., 228 Ga. 512, 513, 186 S.E.2d 732, 734 (1972) (stating the general
principle that a county can exercise no powers except as expressly given or necessarily
implied).
52.

Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 634 WASH. L. REV. 51, 71

(1989).
53. Interview with Jeannie Hallmark, former Executive Director of the Pike County
Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 17, 1993).
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governments, who must still feed at the trough of the state. Similarly,
local disputes are likely to be decided by the courts within the larger
context of state government, and that context is likely to preempt local
concerns.
III. COURT ACTIONS
Courts resolve disagreements by determining legality." Therefore,
the most successful court actions are based on strict textual, constitutional validations of authorizing statutes and statutory preemptions of
local regulations.

Challenges based on general constitutional and

statutory powers are less reliable. Legal remedies for money damages
are generally inappropriate because these challenges are all ultimately
about the limits of power. Therefore, potential litigants involved in local
government disputes, even over county budget allocations, generally get

into court by filing actions in equity. Apart from complaints presenting
constitutional questions, the extraordinary writ of mandamus" is
Other potential actions
probably the most popular cause of action.'
are injunction,57 declaratory judgment, 5" and simple equity.

A.

ConstitutionalQuestions

Challenges to local government conduct properly based on specific text
in the state constitution generally succeed. The Georgia courts
themselves rely on express constitutional authority to invalidate laws
that violate the constitution.59
A recent case, Fulton u. Baker," brought the supreme court's
attention to the constitutional proscription on bills of attainder.61 In

54. Board of Comm'rs of Fulton County v. 1991 Tax Digest for Fulton County, 261 Ga.
702, 703, 410 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1991).
55. O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21 (1992).

56. See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 1 (1989).
57. O.C.G.A. § 9-5-1 (1992).
58. Id. § 9-4-2.
59. "Legislative acts in violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United
States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them." GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5
(1983).
60. 261 Ga. 710, 410 S.E.2d 735 (1991).
61. Id. at 711, 410 S.E.2d at 736; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 10; U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1. A bill of attainder is a retroactive law making judgment and imposing
punishment, historically for treason, now for any disloyal activity (Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475 (1977)) on an individual, or narrowly defined group,
without the benefit of judicial proceedings. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315
(1946). See also Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813) and
18th century Virginia laws confiscating lands of British traitors.
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January of 1991, one of three Douglas County commissioners died,
creating a vacancy on the board. The two other commissioners
appointed Laurie Fulton to fill the vacancy on February 11. A local
act' was introduced in the general assembly on February 12 to make
temporary any person appointed to fill a vacancy in Douglas County
between January 1, 1991 and February 25, 1991. The only person
fitting the criteria of the act was Laurie Fulton. "The local act, not a
court of law, mandates that Fulton forfeit her office." 63 As such it fits
the definition of a bill of attainder and is unconstitutional." Given the
clear constitutional basis for the challenge, the supreme court was
unfazed by the local political considerations; and Commissioner Fulton
prevailed.'
B.

Legislative Preemption
For county officials, the biggest courtroom reality is legislative
preemption. More than any other doctrine of decision, legislative
preemption, or deference to a co-equal branch of government, is a court's
way of resolving local government disputes without getting involved in
them. The hierarchy of state law is also based on express constitutional
authority."
In Mobley v. Polk County,67 a general act controlled the hours of
operation of the county courthouse.'
The supreme court held in
part 9 that the Polk Count Commissioners, having the legislative duty
"to keep the county courthouse and the county offices maintained therein
open," therefore had the power to require the tax commissioner to keep

62. 1991 Ga. Laws 3501-02.
63. Fulton, 261 Ga. at 712, 410 S.E.2d at 737.
64. Id. at 710, 410 S.E.2d at 735.
65. Id. at 713, 410 S.E.2d at 737-38.
66.

"The power granted to counties ...

shall not be construed to extend to ...

any

other matters which the General Assembly by general law has preempted or may hereafter
preempt, but such matters shall be the subject of general law or the subject of local acts
. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c).
67. 242 Ga. 798, 251 S.E.2d 538 (1979).
68. Id. at 779, 251 S.E.2d at 540.
69. The other part of the holding upheld the principle, also enunciated in Warren v.
Walton, that the home rule grant of authority to the county commissioners was expressly
excluded from reaching to the conduct of constitutionally protected officers, in this case the
Polk County Tax Commissioner. Mobley, 242 Ga. at 802,251 S.E.2d at 541. For an earlier
decision on exempt county officers see Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405
(1973).
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his office open from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. 0 The local act preempted setting
independent office hours at each county officer's preference.7 1
The case of Hart v. Madden72 turned on whether a county practice,
started in the 1970s, was authorized by a local act or preempted by the
constitution of 1983."
The particular question was whether the
language of the constitution, allowing county governing authorities to
supplement the compensation of county officers, includes the authority
to pay health insurance premiums for those officers.'
A local act
established the Madison County governing authority in 1965 with
plenary powers over county matters.75 Given that political reality, the
majority decided without further comment that the constitutional grant
of county home rule, in combination with the local act, was persuasive
of the general assembly's intent to authorize the insurance payments.
The local practice was not preempted."
The dissent cited a Dillon's Rule case7 7 against broad delegation of
local power in line with the concerns of the 1980 committee responsible
for redrafting the home rule section of the 1983 Georgia Constitution.7"
This split decision suggests that actions challenging broad home rule
delegations might succeed if particular conduct can be framed against
recognized state interests.

70.

O.C.G.A. § 36-1-12 (1992).

71.
72.

Mobley, 242 Ga. at 801, 251 S.E.2d at 541.
256 Ga. 497, 349 S.E.2d 737 (1986).

73. Id. at 497-98, 349 S.E.2d at 737-38.
74. Id. "Minimum compensation for said county officers may be established by the
General Assembly by general law. Such minimum compensation may be supplemented by

local law or, if such authority is delegated by local law, by action of the county governing
authority." GA. CoNsT. art. X, § 1, para. 3 (b) (1976).
75. 1965 Ga. Laws 2667.
76. 256 Ga. at 498, 349 S.E.2d at 738.
77. 256 Ga. at 498, 349 S.E.2d at 738 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Beazley v. DeKalb
County, 210 Ga. 41, 77 S.E.2d 740 (1953) (Beazley was decided before adoption of the 1966
Home Rule for Counties amendment to the Georgia Constitution.)) For Dillon's Rule, see
supra note 44.
78. While the Subcommittee on County and Municipal affairs actually decided to
reverse the Dillon's Rule presumption (COMMrrTEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 30 (July
9, 1980)), and the SUBCOMmTTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION agreed
(CoMmrrTEE ON REVISION, supra note 6, at 33-41 (June 23, 1980)), a conflicting consensus

in favor of legislative preemption of local salary determination was also reached rather
than risk constitutional language that would permit a local governing authority to control
constitutional county officers with the power of the purse. STATE OF GEORGIA SELECT
COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 1977-1981, TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS,
COMMITTEE TO REVmE ART. IX, VOL. 2, SuBcoMMrrTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION, REORGANIZATION AND GENERAL CONCERNS 113-26 (Oct. 30, 1980).
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Classic legislative preemption is illustrated by McCorkle v. Bignault.9 The issue in McCorkle was payment of indigent defense bills
in Chatham County.' The court found that Chatham County had the
options of participating, or not, in the state-funded indigent defense
program established by the Georgia Indigent Defense Act."' The Act
established procedures for approving fee payments independently of the
Chatham County Commission Chairman. Once the County signed on to
the program, it was preempted from interposing the local county custom
"of having the chairman of the board [of commissioners) review and
approve all requests for county funds in excess of $999 prior to their
disbursement."' Thus, the courts relied on a legislative act specifying
procedures that preempted alternate county customs.
C.

Mandamus
When a local official claims that the duties appertaining to their office
are thwarted by another official's failure to act, or by such limited acts
as amount to no action at all, mandamus is the correct remedy.'
Mandamus is essentially a request to the courts to enforce a clear legal
right, demanded against a defendant," who has refused to act.'
Characterized as an extraordinary writ, it is a way to "jump start" the
government.
In Grimsley v. Twiggs County," the court established a test for the
proper use of mandamus: 1) there must be a compelling need essential
to the orderly administration of the [office seeking relief]; 2) there must
be an abuse of authority in refusing to act; 3) both 1 and 2 must be
based on clear and convincing evidence; 4) a record must be made
establishing that a demand had been made and refused; and 5) in
review, a rational trier of fact would find clear and convincing evidence

79.
80.
81.
(Supp.
82.

83.

260 Ga. 758, 399 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
Id. at 759, 399 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 760, 399 S.E.2d at 918. See 1979 Ga. Laws 367; O.C.G.A.
1994).
McCorkle, 260 Ga. at 760, 399 S.E.2d at 917.

§§

17-12-30 to -92

Grims/ey, 249 Ga. at 632, 292 S.E.2d at 675.

84. The inquiry is not into the power of the official, but rather into the official's act or
failure to act according to a legally imposed duty. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 170 (1803).
85. O.C.G. § 9-6-20 (1992); see also R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS
IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 7.21 (1989).
86. 249 Ga. 632, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982) (applying the writ of mandamus to remedy

budgetary restrictions imposed by county governing authorities over separate branches of
local government).
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to support the issuance of the writ."7 The high level of proof needed to
pass this clear and convincing standard favors the defendant in
mandamus actions.
Professor Sentell estimates two out of three cases are decided against
the plaintiff.'
Potential litigants should be aware of the following
pitfalls: 1) failure to sue the correct person legally responsible for the
performance of the required act; 2) failure to prove that the purported
duty is strictly within the defendant's sphere of responsibility; 3) failure
to state a clear legal right; 4) failure to prove that a request or demand
has in fact been made and refused; 5) failure to seek an alternative
available remedy; 6) failure to recognize that relief as requested would
be futile; 7) failure to understand that discretion is practically a bar
against the use of mandamus unless abuse of discretion is so gross as to
amount to no discretion at all; 8) failure to understand that mandamus
will force an official to act but with no guarantee as to result; 9) failure
to limit relief to a specific act as opposed to a general course of conduct;
10) failure to recognize that elapsed time may make the remedy sought
too speculative to be enforceable by the courts; and 11) lack of "clean
hands."' Avoiding these pitfalls is not a guarantee of success, but it
improves the chances for a decision based on the merits of one's case.
D. Injunction
Intragovernment injunctions seek court orders to stop particular
conduct, and are generally linked to both constitutionally and statutorially based challenges. In the case of Peacock v. Georgia Municipal
Ass'n,9 a group of police officers and civilians filed a constitutional
challenge to halt the lobbying activities of the Georgia Municipal
Association and the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia.9
They contended that the two organizations were funded primarily by
dues collected as tax revenues under both the constitution and statutes
of Georgia, but that neither the constitution nor the statutes authorized
lobbying as a legitimate purpose for tax collection. They asked for an
injunction to stop the two organizations from conducting lobbying
92
activities and from using tax revenues to support those activities.

87. Id. at 634, 292 S.E.2d at 677-78.
88. R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 31 (1989).
89. This list is derived from R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN

(1989).
90. 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981).
91. Id. at 740, 279 S.E.2d at 436.
92. Id.

GEORGA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw
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The supreme court first found that the activities complained of were not
in fact lobbying, and second, that tax collection for the kind of activities
in which the two organizations were engaged was a legitimate public
purpose connected with the administration of local governments." The
constitutional and statutory bases for the challenge therefore failed, and
the court denied the injunction."4
By flipping the perspective, an injunction to stop conduct can have the
effect of compelling the opposite conduct. Such was the case in Chaffin
v. Calhoun,95 in which an injunction was eventually issued to stop the
sheriff from resisting the board of commissioners' reallocation of law
enforcement personnel and equipment." In effect the sheriff was given
two days to turn over personnel and equipment in compliance with the
court order.97
E.

DeclaratoryJudgment
Local government actions for declaratory judgments are generally
framed in terms of constitutional validity. For example, in Bussell v.
Youngblood," the Laurens County sheriff sought a declaratory judgment validating a local act.99 The act called for budget proposals to be
submitted to the county commissioners and conflicting proposals to be
finally resolved by the county grand jury. Both parties complied with
the requirements of the act and the grand jury decided in favor of the
sheriff. When the sheriff challenged the county commissioners to abide
by the grand jury determination, they countersued asking the court for
a declaratory judgment invalidating the local act. The superior court
held that the local act purporting to grant special duties to the Laurens
County Grand Jury conflicted with, and was therefore precluded by, a
general act defining grand juries."0 Citing the constitutional prohibi-

93. Id. at 741, 279 S.E.2d at 436.
94. Id. at 743, 279 S.E.2d at 437.
95. 262 Ga. 202, 204, 415 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1992).
96. Id. at 204, 415 S.E.2d at 908.
97. Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 and Calhoun v. Chaffin, No. 91-CV-0716 at
84 (Sup. Ct. Henry County, May 31, 1991). A temporary restraining order was first issued
by Judge Castellani to stop the transfer of police personnel and equipment from the
sheriff's department to the county police pending the final determination of the respective
rights of the board of county commissioners and sheriff in the allocation of county law
enforcement resources. The order was granted on March 18, 1991 as an interlocutory
injunction, in the case of Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 Sup. Ct. Henry County,
March 13, 1991.
98. 239 Ga. 553, 238 S.E.2d 89 (1977).
99. Id. at 554, 238 S.E.2d at 91; see also 1960 Ga. Laws 2199.
100. Bussell, 239 Ga. at 554, 238 S.E.2d at 91.
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tion against special laws that conflict with general laws,1"' the supreme court affirmed. 2 The sheriff lost.' '
F

Equity
Actions in equity are simply actions based on fairness for which no
legal remedy exists. These actions may or may not include the more
specific actions of mandamus or injunction. For example, in McCorkle
1 the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners in Chatv. Bignault,"'
ham County erroneously believed that he could veto any expenditures
greater than $999 because that was how it had always been done.' 5
The chairman halted indigent defense payments to four attorneys who
had submitted bills conforming to the standard procedures established
by the Georgia Indigent Defense Act' ' and subscribed to by Chatham
County."° The superior court judge properly denied an action for
mandamus to force the errant chairman to pay the submitted bills.
Approval of the bills was beyond his authority.' ' Mandamus failing,
equity was all that remained. Since Georgia courts discourage judgments based on technicalities rather than merit,'' and because the
Chatham chairman next attempted to have the judge recuse himself, the
action was allowed to continue in general equity.
The judge then joined the attorneys' case with another action seeking
injunctive relief against the chairman's ability to personally approve or
disapprove of requests for indigent defense fees.1 ' Deciding for the
101. "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state, and
no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by exisiting
law." GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 7 (which was slightly altered in the GA. CONST. 1983 to
read "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state and no
local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by
general law...... GA. CONST. art. II, § 6, para. 4(a) (emphasis added).
102. Bussell, 239 Ga. at 555, 239 S.E.2d at 91.
103. In the sequel case, the sheriff also lost an action for an injunction on review of the
budget in which the supreme court struck down as an unconstitutional delegation of
authority from the sheriffs department to the Dublin Police Department, an attempt to
contractually tie the sheriffs deputies' salaries to the pay scale of similarly qualified
officers in the Dublin Police Department. Lovett v. Bussell, 242 Ga. 405, 249 S.E.2d 86
(1978).
104. 260 Ga. 758, 399 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
105. Id. at 761, 399 S.E.2d at 918.
106. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-12-30 to -92 (Supp. 1994).
107. McCorkle, 260 Ga. at 759, 399 S.E.2d at 916.
108. Mandamus actions will not lie to enforce an action that is not within the legal
duties of the defendant. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
109. See Russell v. Smokerise Bath & Racquet Club, 243 Ga. 724, 728,256 S.E.2d 457,
460 (1979) (Hill, J., concurring).
110. McCorkle, 260 Ga. at 760, 399 S.E.2d at 917.
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attorneys, the trial judge held the chairman personally responsible for
the invoices he had blocked."1 Affirming the trial court's decision in
part, the supreme court held that mere custom is insufficient to
overcome the requirements of a general law.1 2 Thus, this action in
equity was eventually resolved on the doctrine of legislative preemption.
McCorkle is a rare example of dollar damages being awarded in a local
government dispute.113
IV.

DOUBLE DEFERENCE AND THE CONCEPT OF DISCRETION

The American adversarial system of court law is at its best when
resolving particular cases and controversies. The system thrives on
Procedural
particular facts to focus competing social interests.
perfection helps smooth the way. 4 Procedural error may prevent
reaching the merits. 1 5 Actions based on the constitutionality of
general or local acts are decided on state policy grounds regardless of
local politics. When the action is based on mere disagreement, however,
the courts adopt a hands-off policy. County administrative officers in
charge of county affairs have broad discretion,1 ' and the power of the
courts to review local conduct is exercised with caution. 7 Thus, when
litigation becomes inevitable, the challenger of the status quo is at a
considerable disadvantage. The courts view county government as a coequal branch of government whose problems are properly the problems

111. Id. at 761, 399 S.E.2d at 918.
112. Id. at 760, 399 S.E.2d at 917.
113. Id.

114. It is not my intention to minimize the importance of procedural perfection when
surveying how best to use the courts to resolve local government disputes. It is, however,
beyond the scope of this Article because procedural rules tend to vary more rapidly than
substantive law (see, e.g., R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO INGEORGIA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 86-106 (1987)) and because practicing attorneys are bound to
know the required procedures applicable in each jurisdiction.
115. In an extreme effort to avoid local politics, the Georgia Supreme Court considered
a zoning case in which the plaintiff claimed a right to a building permit since he had
complied with the relevant county ordinance. The court held that plaintiff's failure to
present the material county ordinance at trial was a fatal error in establishing a clear legal
right to the remedy sought. Hernandez v. Board of Comm'rs, 242 Ga. 76, 247 S.E.2d 870
(1978).

See also R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL

GOVERNMENT LAw 109 (1989) placing Hernandez in historical context.
116. Turner v. Johnston, 183 Ga. 176, 187 S.E. 864 (1936), cited with approval in
Nelson v. Wainwright, 224 Ga. 693, 694, 164 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1968).
117. See, e.g., Lumpkin County v. Davis, 185 Ga. 393, 195 S.E. 169 (1938) (a case
reviewing conduct of a sheriff in which the court held mandamus "does not lie to control
the conduct of officials, as in this case, vested with a discretion, except... gross abuse of
discretion" Id. at 394, 195 S.E. at 170-71.).
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of the legislature. Actions based on discretionary conduct require court
interference with local government. Therefore, as an overarching
principle, the courts have adopted a double deference standard to avoid
At the trial level, the courts will only
issues of local politics.11
interfere when local officials' actions, based on a clear wrong, amount to
an abuse of discretion." 9 Additionally, the appellate courts only
if a clear wrong amounting to
interfere with the trial court's conclusions
120
an abuse of discretion at trial exists.
In the extremely political case of Chaffin v. Calhoun,' two local
judges recused themselves from the hearings. The judges feared they
could not possibly decide in favor of the sheriff without jeopardizing
their own future budgetary requests before the Henry County Board of
Commissioners.122 The case was therefore heard in DeKalb County by
special arrangement. The trial court found in favor of the defendants
based on evidence in support of the county commissioners' plans to
On direct appeal to the supreme
establish a county police force."
court,' 4 the court applied a deferential standard of review to the
defendants' discretionary conduct and the trial court's evaluation of that
conduct. 2 5 This double deferential standard makes winning or losing
at the trial level nearly conclusive as to the parties' rights. The merits
are not generally up for relitigation on appeal or certiorari.
In Wilson v. Southerland,2 the issue was judicial review in the
context of a budgetary conflict between the district attorney of the

118. For a selective review of the early cases see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUS IN GEORGLA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 88-90 (1989) where the author, citing

Wood v. Board of Educ. of Washington County, 137 Ga. 808, 74 S.E. 540 (1912), states that
"the court indicated, at least, an ingrained aversion to a substantial review of [the]
evidence, and assuredly to a minute weighing of the details." In a case seeking court
review of the orientation of the Chatsworth Courthouse in Murray County, the court stated,
"It is impossible, in our complex civilization, to prescribe the exact manner in which every
official act must be performed." Dunn v. Beck, 144 Ga. 148, 152, 86 S.E. 385, 387 (1915).
119. See, e.g., Whatley, 224 Ga. at 670, 164 S.E.2d at 122. "This court will not interfere
with the discretionary action ofthe county commissioners within the sphere of their legally
delegated powers, unless such action amounts to an abuse ofdiscretion." (quoted favorably
in Fulton County v. 1991 Tax Digest, 261 Ga. 702, 703, 410 S.E.2d 721, 721 (1991)).
120. Chaffin, 262 Ga. at 204, 415 S.E.2d at 908.
121. Id. at 202, 415 S.E.2d at 906.
122. Personal Interview with Donald Chaffin, Sheriff of Henry County (Apr. 13, 1993).
123. Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 and Calhoun v. Chaffin, No. 91-CV-0716 at
78 (Sup. Ct. Henry County, May 31, 1991).
124. Chaffin, 262 Ga. at 202, 415 S.E.2d at 906. The Supreme Court of Georgia has
appellate jurisdiction on all cases in equity. GA. CONsT. 1983, art. VI, § 6, para. § (2).
Direct appeal is authorized under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(4) (Supp. 1994).
125. Chaffin, 262 Ga. at 204, 415 S.E.2d at 908.
126. 258 Ga. 479, 371 S.E.2d 382 (1988).
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Cherokee Circuit and the Gordon County Commissioners. 127 In 1986
the district attorney's office operated, in part, under a Gordon County
budget of $48,118. For 1987, the district attorney submitted a budget
request to Gordon County of $72,333. The Gordon County Commissioners cut the request to $7,700, and the court refused to interfere.' s The
county governing authority has statutory authority over government
including the duty to inspect the county budget. 130
oversight,'
Although the standard for review of this authority is the deferential
"abuse of discretion" standard, 3 an eighty-eight percent reduction in
the district attorney's budget would appear to be an "abuse of discretion."132 However, the supreme court found no trial court error in light
of the cautionary policy when reviewing the conduct of another branch
of government."3 Justice Clarke noted, "[Tihis conclusion does not
dictate that a different result in the trial court would necessarily have
been error.""3 4
A recent example of the supreme court's reluctance to invade a local
government's sphere of power is Board of Commissioners of Fulton
County v. 1991 Tax Digest for Fulton County." 5 In Board of Commissioners, the court affirmed the trial court's order for temporary collection
of real property taxes. 36 However, the court reversed the part of the
order requiring the county commission to justify the wisdom of proposed
county expenditures. Justification of discretionary acts was found
beyond the scope of an "abuse of discretion" review of local government
conduct.'37 Potential litigants over budget disagreements should

127. Id. at 479, 371 S.E.2d at 382-83.
128. Id.
129. O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22.1(7) (1992).
130. Board of Comm'rs of Richmond County v. Whittle, 180 Ga. 166, 178, 202 S.E. 534
(1934).
131. Dunn v. Beck, 144 Ga. 148, 86 S.E. 385 (1915).
132. In a 1991 Pike County action to dismiss the county attorney in a dispute between
the county tax commissioner and the governing authority, Judge Andrew Whalen was
given case law limiting the defendant's right to probe the relationship between the county
attorney and the opposing parties. He read it at the bench, looked at opposing counsel who
said that the offered case was hard to reconcile with the general rule and said, "I don't
understand it either; but apparently that's the law." And the point was won by the
plaintiff. Pike County v. Reid, 91V-117 (1991) (personal recollecton).
133. Wilson, 258 Ga. at 480-81, 371 S.E.2d at 384.
134. Id. at 481, 371 S.E.2d at 384.
135. 261 Ga. 702, 410 S.E.2d 721 (1991).
136. Id. at 702, 410 S.E.2d at 721.
137. Id. at 702-03, 410 S.E.2d at 721.
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beware. The lesson of local government law in Georgia is the courts will
not oversee county management. 3 8
V.

COURT CASE RESOLUTIONS OF GENERAL DISAGREEMENTS
cases, Warren v. Walton,'39 Wolfe v. Huff ("Wolfe I"),' Wolfe

Four
v. Huff ("Wolfe II")," and Chaffin v. Calhoun,'4 2 each involving a
dispute between county commissioners and sheriffs, illustrate how the
courts resolve general county power disputes. These cases arise partially
out of a paradox' built into the home rule article of the Georgia
Constitution'" and partially out of competing duties defined by

138.
139.
140.

Id. at 703, 410 S.E.2d at 721.
231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405 (1973).
232 Ga. 44, 205 S.E.2d 254 (1974).

141. 233 Ga. 162, 210 S.E.2d 699 (1974).
142. 262 Ga. 202, 415 S.E.2d 906 (1992).
143. Perhaps the simplest paradox is the so-called Socrates Paradox, "This statement
is false." Two statements, plausible in isolation, may create a paradox when combined.
For example, "Eggs come before chickens" and "Chickens come before eggs." Each is
plausible on its own, but combined, one contradicts the other. The contradiction is resolved
only by strictly limiting or invalidating one or both statements.
Law is a logical system; logical systems yield paradoxes. Identifying and solving
paradoxes develops a better system. But Cf , 'The life of the law has not been logic, it has
been experience." O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881)
In the great run of cases which come before the courts, the selection of principles,
and the determination of whether the facts are to be stated in terms of one or
another minor premise, are the chief tasks to be performed. These are difficult
tasks, full of hazards and uncertainties, but the hazards and uncertainties are
ordinarily concealed by the glib use of formal logic.
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 72 (1963).
144. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1 (1983). This paradox is based on two clauses in
the home rule article of the Georgia Constitution.
The governing authority of each county shall have legislative power to adopt
clearly reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or regulations relating to its property,
affairs, and local government for which no provision has been made by general law
and which is not inconsistent with this Constitution or any local law applicable
This, however, shall not restrict the authority of the General
thereto ....
Assembly by general law to further define this power or to broaden, limit, or
otherwise regulate the exercise thereof.
GA. CONsr. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(a)-(b) (1983).
The power granted to counties ... shall not be construed to extend to the
following matters... (1) Action affecting any elective county office (i.e., sheriff,
probate judge, clerk of the superior court, and tax commissioner, or tax receiver
and tax collector, specifically enumerated in GA. CoNST. 1983, art. IX, § 1, [ 3) the
salaries thereof, or the personnel thereof, except the personnel subject to the
jurisdiction of the county governing authority.
GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. I(cXI) (1983). These two clauses combine to grant county
governing authorities the power to control officers who are expressly exempt from just such
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statute.'I In general, the county governing authority has primary
responsibility for overseeing all county governments. Other county
offices have independent responsibility for particular services.'
For
example, the governing authority has statutory control over the sheriff's
budget.'4 7 The sheriff is responsible for the successful operation of his
office which depends on county funding. Apart from the general act
establishing minimum sheriff's compensation,"4 funding the sheriff's
office currently depends on goodwill, enlightened self interest, political
muscle, or a local act. The same conditions exist between each of the
county officers and the county governing authority. The tension created
by these conditions arguably poses a political, not a legal question.
In Warren v. Walton,'49 the court concluded that some county offices
are beyond the control of the county governing authority."' The
sheriff of Hancock County filed a mandamus action to force the county
commissioners to furnish him with two radio equipped automobiles. He
claimed these were necessary for the performance of his duties as keeper
of the peace.' 5 ' Basing his complaint on a local act passed by the
general assembly, the sheriff prevailed at the trial hearing. The
commissioners relied heavily on a defense that the local act directed
their conduct-in violation of the constitution. They claimed the home
rule clause grants the governing authority discretionary power to all
county property. Furthermore, they intended to exercise their plenary
discretionary powers by repealing the offending sections of the local act,
including the part that authorized the sheriff to appoint a chief deputy
and three other deputies at specified salaries. Faced with this answer,
the sheriff filed two additional petitions. One petition was filed to

control.
145. For a list of the applicable code sections, see appendix I.
146. See, e.g., Mobley, 242 Ga. at 802, 251 S.E.2d at 541 (1978).
No matter how desirable uniformity of work regulations of various employees, of
various county offices in the seat of government may be, county commissioners as
the governing authority of the fiscal affairs of Polk County do not have authority,
express or implied, to establish work regulations for employees of another elected

county officer.
Id. See also appendix I, below, for relevant code references together with GA. CONST. of
1983, art. IX and local acts; J.D. WEEKS & P.T. HARDY, HANDBOOK FOR GEORGIA COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS 66 (3d ed. 1993).
147. See O.C.G.A § 36-5-22.1 (1993) (sheriff's budget subject to authority of county
commission) and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220(5) (1991) (county taxes may be levied and collected
to pay sheriffs).
148. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-20 (1994).
149. 231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405 (1973).
150. Id. at 499-500, 202 S.E.2d at 409.
151. Id. at 496, 202 S.E.2d at 407.
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compel the commissioners to pay the salaries and the other to enjoin
them from repealing the act. The commissioners relied on an additional
clause in the home rule article of the constitution that authorizes the
governing authority of each county "to fix the salary, compensation, and
expenses of those employed by such governing authority."'52
The controlling issue was whether the constitution prohibited the
general assembly from enacting a local law expressly authorizing the
Hancock County Sheriff: 1) to have two radio equipped patrol cars for
the use of his deputies, and 2) to appoint a chief deputy sheriff and three
other deputies sheriffs at specified salaries not to exceed $7,000 and
$6,000 respectively.15 Given the constitutional challenge, the supreme
court looked first at the Hancock County Commissioners' home rule
source of authority "to fix the salary.""s4 The court found this section
inapplicable to control an elected and constitutionally protected sheriff
because of the special exemption for elective county officers in paragraph
I(c)(1) of the same article."5 Writing for the court, Justice Grice stated
that "the office of sheriff is specifically exempt from Home Rule.""5 He
affirmed the established rule that the sheriff is not an employee of the
county governing authority,' 7 home rule notwithstanding, and he thus
integrated the relatively modern home rule provisions into established
case law.'
The local act, surviving the constitutional challenge,
authorized the sheriff's conduct and directed the county commissioners
to provide the patrol cars and pay the indicated salaries.'5 9 Having
determined that the county commissioners' role was strictly ministerial,

152. Id. at 498, 202 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. l(f) (1983),
formerly GA. CONST. art. XV, § 2(a), para. 2 (1977)).

153. Id. at 496, 498, 202 S.E.2d at 406-08 (citing 1973 Ga. Laws 3237).
154. Id. at 498-99,202 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting GA. CoNsT., art. XV, § 2-A, para. 2 (1977)
which language is identical to GA. CONST., art. IX, § 2, para. 1(f) (1983)).
155. Id. at 499, 202 S.E.2d at 408 (citing Ga. CONST. art. XV, § 2-A, para. 1(cX1) (1977)
(which language is identical to GA. CONST., art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c) (1) (1983)).
156. 231 Ga. at 499, 202 S.E.2d at 408.
157. Id. at 500, 202 S.E.2d at 409; see Truesdel v. Freeney, 186 Ga. 288, 197 S.E. 783
(1938).
158. Id. Likewise, and by analogy, the entire pre-home rule body of case law relating
to other local government conflicts was left intact and remains persuasive. See also
Stephenson v. Board of Comm'rs of Cobb County, 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991) and
Board of Comm'rs of Randolph County v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482, 396 S.E.2d 903 (1990), both

of which cite with approval cases that pre-date the 1966 Home Rule Amendment. The line
of cases defining what a county officer is and whether a particular office is subject to the
power of the county governing authority dates back at least as far as Polk v. James, 68 Ga.
128 (1881), and many of the relevant cites are included in Employees Retirement Sys. v.
Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 476, 136 S.E.2d 518 (1964).

159.

231 Ga. at 500, 202 S.E.2d at 409-10.
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the supreme court found no error in the trial court's conclusion that
mandamus was the appropriate remedy.'c The sheriff thus won at
the trial and appellate levels.
Wolfe 1161 involved an injunction by the sheriff of Clarke County to
preclude the commissioners from establishing a county police force. 62
Basing his complaint on the common law heritage of the sheriff's
office" and on his duties as defined by statute,'" the sheriff was
granted some relief, "but not very much."la The sheriff retained his
right to participate in the preservation of the peace and enforcement of
the laws, and the commissioners were enjoined from denying cooperation
between the county police force and the sheriff's department. However,
the commissioners gained the right to reallocate county resources when
other county officers used them in wasteful, negligent, or ineffective
ways.' 66 Writing for the full court, Justice Gunter stated that the
"trial judge attempted
to harmonize the conflicting claims ...in a most
167
reasonable manner."

Wolfe 1II ' followed Wolfe I and addressed the commissioners'
counterclaim. In Wolfe II the trial court held that a county governing
authority may not indirectly limit the duties of another county office if
the same action is illegal when done directly.'
The commissioners
did win the right to establish a county police force in partial derogation
of the sheriff's law enforcement capacity, 7 ' although refusal to provide
the sheriff with any funds for law enforcement duties was found a
complete abrogation of the commissioners' executive duty to use
discretion in managing the county budget.' 7 1 County commissioners
may not use their authority over both the county budget and county
property to avoid cooperating with other county officers. 172 Implicitly,

160. Id., 202 S.E.2d at 410.
161. 232 Ga. 44, 205 S.E.2d 254 (1974).
162. Id. at 44-45, 205 S.E.2d at 255.
163. See Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 322, 18 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1942) (holding in part
that the sheriff's duties include common law duties except as modified by statute including
the duty "to preserve the peace") cited favorably in Foster v.Vickery, 202 Ga. 55, 60, 42
S.E.2d 117, 120 (1947).
164. O.CGA. § 15-16-10(a)(8) (1994). "To perform such other duties as are or may be
imposed by law or which necessarily appertain to his or her office." Id.
165. Wolfe, 232 Ga. at 45, 205 S.E.2d at 255.
166. Id. at 46, 205 S.E.2d at 255-56.
167. Id. at 47, 205 S.E.2d at 256.
168. 233 Ga. 162, 210 S.E.2d 699 (1974).
169. Id. at 163, 210 S.E.2d at 700.
170. Id. at 163-64, 210 S.E.2d at 700.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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all county officers exercise complementary powers for the administration
of government. An abuse of discretion by the county commissioners that
ignores the contribution of another county office is contrary to state
interest and appropriately remedied by the courts. 173
Recently, the supreme court revisited the issue of county cooperation
in Chaffin v. Calhoun.174 The disagreement arose between the commissioners and the sheriff of Henry County. The commissioners sought
an injunction to compel the sheriff to cooperate in a reduction of his
budget by forty-seven percent and reduction of personnel by sixty-five
people. The sheriff based his resistance to the injunction on the
constitutional clause exempting his office from control by the county
commissioners."' 5 He relied on Wolfe I for the proposition that the
commissioners could not unilaterally withdraw his law enforcement
capacity by the creation of a county police force.17 ' Wolfe II was used
him to
to support the proposition that the commissioners could not force
177
budget.
his
reducing
by
duties
enforcement
law
his
relinquish
At the hearing, Judge Castellani reframed the issue as one within a
larger context of service to the citizens. 17 Rather than address the
relative scope of the commissioners' and sheriff's power, the judge found
that the case required court guidance on the appropriate allocation of
county personnel needed for the two offices to fulfill their constitutional
and statutory duties.179 Since the trial court did not find law enforcement to be part of the sheriff's constitutionally protected duties, it
ordered an injunction requiring the sheriff "to cooperate in the implementation of a plan to transfer personnel and equipment to the newly
created county police department.lss In support of the injunction, the
trial court stated, "[W]e are to concern ourselves with providing services
that are efficient and effective and cost effective but within the

173. Id.
174. 262 Ga. at 202, 415 S.E.2d at 906.
175. Id. at 203, 415 S.E.2d at 907; GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c) (1983). See also
Warren, 231 Ga. at 495, 222 S.E.2d at 405.
176. Wolfe, 232 Ga. at 45, 205 S.E.2d at 255.
177. Wolfe, 233 Ga. at 164, 210 S.E.2d at 701.
178. Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 at 35 (Sup. Ct. Henry County, Mar. 13, 1991)
(hearing on order granting preliminary injunction).

179.

Since the supreme court chose not to address this aspect of the case below, Chaffin

v. Calhoun illustrates the avoidance doctrine in court resolution of political problems. In

terms of the chicken and egg paradox it would be like inquiring whether or not one could
start a chicken farm if there were no such thing as chicken eggs. The paradox of whether
chickens or eggs came first is avoided by determining that chicken farms can be started
with a loan from the bank.
180. Chaffin, 262 Ga. at 202, 415 S.E.2d at 907.
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parameters [of] our offices.""
Gone was the issue of whether the
county commissioners must prove wasteful, negligent, or ineffective use
of resources to withdraw them from another county official. Gone was
the issue of whether the budget was adequate for the reasonable
operation of the sheriff's department.'8 2 Gone, even, was the issue of
efficiency. Nowhere in the record did Judge Castellani take evidence on
the relative efficiency of the sheriff's department versus the commissioners' new police department.03
On the sheriff's appeal, the commissioners argued that they had not
withdrawn all of the sheriff's law enforcement capacities and that the
trial court could have found the transfer of personnel and equipment
necessary to avoid duplication of police powers. The supreme court
relied on general and local acts defining the duties of county officers to
uphold the trial court order and avoid meddling in the county system.'"' Ignoring the underlying question of whether the governing
authority could tell the sheriff how to run his office, the court looked
first at the general laws defining the sheriff's duties. The court found
certain "enumerated duties such as maintaining the jail and serving
warrants, [and] also those duties that 'necessarily appertain to his office,'
such as the power to make arrests, to maintain the peace and to enforce
the law." l"s
However, the court did not find local acts limiting the Henry County
Commissioners' power to establish a county police department.ss

181. Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91.CV-0334 at 36 (Sup. Ct. Henry County Mar. 18, 1991)
(hearing on order granting preliminary injunction).

182. In delivering his opinion, the judge did leave open the possibility that the sheriff
might elect to file a fifth lawsuit in order to challenge the adequacy of the budget allocation
passed by the commissioners. Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 and Calhoun v. Chaffin,
No. 91-CV-0716 at 81 (Sup. Ct. Henry County, May 31, 1991). However, that issue was
made moot when the supreme court affirmed the injunction.
183. The fact that Henry County had previously operated a police department and had
dissolved it in 1985 when the police chief was convicted of drug trafficking was not

introduced into evidence. Personal Interview with Donald Chaffin, Sheriff of Henry County
(Apr. 13, 1993). What did come into evidence was $100,000 that would become available
only to whoever was operating the narcotics enforcement in Henry County (Chaffin v.
Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 and Calhoun v. Chaffin, No. 91-CV-0716 at 32 (Sup. Ct. Henry
County, May 31, 1991)) and an additional $185,488.60 of federal money that would be
available only to whoever ran the police. Id. at 39. These monies muddy the motivation
behind the police power struggle in Henry County. However, it is settled that the courts
cannot pass on the wisdom of county operations, just on their legality. Board of Comm'rs
of Fulton County v. 1991 Tax Digest for Fulton County, 261 Ga. at 703, 410 S.E.2d at 722.
184. Chaffin, 262 Ga. at 203, 415 S.E.2d at 907 (citing O.C.G.. § 15-16-10).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 202, 415 S.E.2d at 907. The court footnoted a 1992 general law (O.C.GA.
§ 36-8-1 (1992); 1992 Ga. Laws 324) that requires preliminary ratification by popular vote
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Having concluded that no issue of legislative preemption existed, 7 the
supreme court deferred to the trial court's conclusion that a forty-seven
percent reduction in budget did not preclude the sheriff from performing
his general duties."s Chief Justice Clarke concluded, "[blecause we
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's entry of injunctive relief;
we affirm."18 9
These four cases illustrate the courts' self-imposed limitation on
intervention in local politics. Absent a clear showing of illegality, the
court resolves disputes by keeping the system going. In the words of
Judge Castellani, "[We are all public servants.""9 The courts are a
humble part of the political process, and their role is limited to
determinations of legality, not operating policy. 9

for any future county actions to create county police departments. 262 Ga. at 203 n.1, 415
S.E.2d at 907 n.1. Interestingly, the court does not refer to the failed 1976 local
constitutional amendment to prohibit the Henry County Commissioners from establishing
a county police department and vesting certain police powers in the office of sheriff. 1976
Ga. Laws 1902.
187. 262 Ga. at 203, 415 S.E.2d at 907. Significantly missing from the opinion were
any references to local acts delegating additional independent power to the Henry County
Sheriff, because there were none. Curiously, reference to a local act (1989 Ga. Laws 4826)
making the sheriffs discretion to employ other deputies and assistants "subject to final
approval of the governing authority ofHenry County," was also omitted, though it was part
of the record of the hearing. Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 at 9 (Sup. Ct. Henry
County, Mar. 13, 1991) (hearing on order granting preliminary injunction).
188. 262 Ga. at 204, 415 S.E.2d at 907-08. Although the supreme court found no abuse
of discretion on the part of the county commissioners and affirmed the trial court's
injunction, Chief Justice Clarke, writing the opinion in Chaffin, indicates that another
outcome at the trial level would have been equally acceptable to the supreme court. Wolfe
I and Wolfe II were cited in favor of the sheriffs position. 262 Ga. at 203-04, 415 S.E.2d
at 907-08. The opinion cited Board ofComm'rs of Randolph County v. Wilson, 260 Ga. 482,
396 S.E.2d 903 (1990) (upholding the commissioners' authority to cut a sheriffs budget);
but also cited Board of Comm'rs of Richmond County v. Whittle, 180 Ga. 166, 178 S.E. 534
(1934) denying the commissioners' authority to direct the sheriff how to spend what is left
of it. Had the issue in Chaffin v. Calhoun not been judicially refrained at trial to avoid the
scope of the commissioners' power, these cases would have been persuasive precedents to
deny the injunction which required the Henry County Sheriff to release more than half of
his staff, turn over part of his equipment, and accept a drastically reduced budget. In the
words of Chief Justice Clarke, however, just based on the record, "we cannot say that the
trial court's finding is clearly erroneous." 262 Ga. at 204, 415 S.E.2d at 908. Given that
reading of the record by the highest court in the state, the sheriff elected to abandon
further litigation and pursue the matter at the next elections. Personal Interview with
Donald Chaffin, Sheriff of Henry County (Apr. 13, 1993).
189. 262 Ga. at 204, 415 S.E.2d at 908.
190. Chaffin v. Calhoun, No. 91-CV-0334 at 35 (Sup. Ct. Henry County, Mar. 13, 1991)
(hearing on order granting preliminary injunction).
191. Board of Comm'rs of Fulton Countyv. 1991 Tax Digest for Fulton County, 261 Ga.
at 703 n.1, 410 S.E.2d at 721 n.1.
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CONCLUSION

"There is nothing in the law that says people cannot get along
...
However, sometimes they do not. When they do not, the law
is their last resort. How the courts have handled the issues is essential
for predicting future resolutions. However, no guarantee exists.
Hopefully, the legal understandings of past decisions will encourage
more rapid resolutions of future arguments before costly litigation
polarizes the parties. If the parties cannot discover local means of
cooperating, then invocation of higher authorities is required. Arguably,
the electorate and the general assembly are better able to resolve local
government disputes than the courts.

APPENDIX I: STATUTORY DUTIES

Statutes define the duties of county officers including Judge of the
Superior Court, 93 Clerk of the Superior Court,'1" Judge of the Probate Court, 195 Judge of the Magistrate Court,'98 District Attorney, 97
sors,°

Grand Jury,"'8 Tax Commissioner,'"
Board of AssesAppraisal Staff,"
Members of the Board of Equaliza-

tion, 2

County

ment Director,'

nty Police.2os

192.

Clerk,

3

County Manager,'

County Treasurer,"

Emergency Manage-

County Coroner,20 7 and Cou-

Personal Interview with Grover Anderson, Probate Judge of Pike County (Summer

1992).
193. See O.C.GA. § 15-6-8, 15-11-5, 19-8-2 (1992).
194. See O.C.GA. §§ 15-6-60 et seq., 36-1-24 (1992) and local acts.
195. See O.C.G.A. 49 15-9-30, 45-16-2, 48-5-211, (1992) and local acts.
196. See O.C.G.A. 94 15-10-2, 36-1-20 (1992).
197. See O.C.GA §§ 15-18-6, 15-18-7 (1992).
198. See O.C.G.A. 99 15-1-12,15-12-7,15-12-71 to -102,20-2-10,20-2-51,20-2-112,20-2394, 36-1-7, 36-9-10, 42-4-8, 48-5-311 (1992) and population acts.
199. See O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-21, 48-5-103, 48-5-127 (1992) and local acts.
200. See O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-298, 48-5-299, 48-5-306 (1992).
201. See O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-263, 48-5-264 (1992).
202. See O.C.GA. § 48-5-311 (1992).
203. See local acts. These local acts, as amended, are indexed by county in the Official
Code of Georgia. O.C.G.A. Vol. 42 (1982).
204. See local acts. These local acts, as amended, are indexed by county in the Official
Code of Georgia. O.C.G.A. Vol. 42 (1982).
205. See O.C.GA § 38-3-27 (1992) and local resolutions.
206. See O.C.GA. § 36-6-14,36-6-15,36-6-16,36-6-16.1,36-6-22 (1992) and local acts.
207. See O.C.G.A. §§ 45-16-6, 45-16-24, 45-16-27, 45-16-27.1, 45-16-66 (1992).
208. See O.C.G.A. § 36-8-5 (1992) and local resolutions.
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Governing Authority's Duties
The general statutory duties of county governing authorities include:
1) control over all county property, 2) taxation, 3) maintenance of roads,
4) examining, settling, and allowing all claims against the county, 5)
control of fiscal affairs, and 6) regulation of health, welfare, and county
police.'
Local acts,21 in combination with general acts,"1 establish and
control the governing authorities in each of the 159 counties in Georgia.
Sheriffs Duties
The general statutory duties of county sheriffs include: 1) execution of
court orders, 2) attendance at superior and probate court sessions, 3)
attendance at election polling places, 4) publication of sales, citations,
and other legal proceedings, 5) performance of any other duties imposed

209.

O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22.1 (1992) Powers and duties; delegation
(a) The governing authority of each county has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the following subject matters:
(1) The directing and controlling of all the property of the county, according
to law, as the governing authority deems expedient;
(2) The levying of a general tax for general county purposes and a special tax
for particular county purposes;
(3) The establishing, altering, or abolishing of all roads, bridges, and ferries
in conformity to law;
(4) Reserved;
(5) The filling of all vacancies in county offices unless some other body or
official is empowered by law to so fill such vacancy;
(6) The examining, settling, and allowing of all claims against the county;
(7) The examining and auditing ofthe accounts of all officers having the care,
management, keeping, collection, or disbursement of money belonging to the
county or appropriated for its use and benefit and the settling of the same;
(8) The making of such rules and regulations for the support of the poor of
the county, for the county police and patrol, for the promotion of health, and for
quarantine as are authorized by law or not inconsistent therewith; and
(9) The regulating of peddling and fixing of the cost of licenses therefor.
(b) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit a local law
from delegating to a chairman or chief executive officer of a county governing
authority jurisdiction over any subject matter provided for in subsection (a) of this
Code section.
210. These local acts, as amended, are indexed by county in the Official Code of
Georgia. O.C.G. Vol. 42 (1992).
211. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22 to -26 et seq. (1992).
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by law or which necessarily relate to the sheriff's office, 212 and 6)
custody of the jail.215
Historically, Georgia sheriffs trace their duties back to England. As
agents of the courts, sheriffs were bailiffs, jailers, servers of court orders,
and evictors or dispossessors of persons illegally in possession of real
property. Over time these duties came to include keeping the peace.214
Just as the office of sheriff in England pre-dated Bobby Peale's police
force, so the office of sheriff in Georgia pre-dated both county and
metropolitan police forces.2 15 In the rural counties of Georgia, sheriffs
still serve as the principal law enforcement officer and actively cooperate

212. O.C.G-A. § 15-16-10 (1994) Duties; penalties
(a) It is the duty of the sheriff:
(1) To execute and return the processes and orders of the courts and of officers
of competent authority, if not void, with due diligence, when delivered to him for
that purpose, according to this Code;
(2) To attend, by himself or his deputy, upon all sessions of the superior court
of the county and also upon sessions of the probate court whenever required by
the judge thereof and, while the courts are in session, never to leave same without
the presence of himself or his deputy, or both, if required;
(3) To attend, in the same manner specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection,
at the place or places of holding an election at the county site, on the day of an
election, from the opening to the closing of the polls, and to take under his charge
all subordinate officers present, as police to preserve order;,
(4) To publish sales, citations, and other proceedings as required by law and
to keep a file of all newspapers in which his official advertisements appear, in the
manner required of clerks of the superior courts;
(5) To keep an execution docket wherein he must enter a full description of all
executions delivered to him and the dates of their delivery, together with all his
actions thereon, and to have the same ready for use in any court of his county;
(6) To keep a book in which shall be entered a record of all sales made by
process of court or by agreement of the parties under the sanction of the court,
describing accurately the property and the process under which sold, the date of
the levy and sale, the purchaser, and the price;
(7) To receive from the preceding sheriff all unexecuted writs and processes
and proceed to execute the same; to carry into effect any levy or arrest made by
a predecessor; to put purchasers into possession, and to make titles to purchasers
at his or her predecessor's sales, when not done by his or her predecessor;, and
(8) To perform such other duties as are or may be imposed by law or which
necessarily appertain to his or her office.
O.C.GA. § 15-16-10 (1994).
213. O.C.G.A. § 42-4-4 (1994).
214. See generally,Steve Gullion, Sheriffs in Search of a Role, NEw LAW JoURNAL 1156
(Aug. 14, 1992).
215. The first authorization for a county police force in Georgia was in 1909, 1909 Ga.
Laws 156.
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with state and municipal police forces.218 However, in metropolitan
counties, political pressure to put law enforcement under the power of
the governing authority tends to relegate the sheriff's duties to
attendance on the courts.217
Local acts may further define individual sheriff's duties, 28 and the
courts have deferred to history by holding that the sheriff's duties
include common law duties not abrogated by statute.210

216. HANDBOOK FOR GEORGIA SHERIFFS 29-30,48-49 (Inge Whittle & Dorothy H. Paul,
eds., 3d ed. 1988).
217. For instance, when the sheriff of DeKalb County refused to limit his role to court
related duties, the commissioners supported a new sheriff candidate who had no
pretensions about doing general law enforcement. The challenger defeated the incumbent
sheriff and the county police department took over the sheriff's law enforcement duties.
Personal Interview with Manual Maloof, Former Chairman of the DeKalb County
Commission (Feb. 3, 1993). For the Henry County analog of the DeKalb commissioners
versus the sheriff conflict, in which the incumbent sheriff was not taken out at the polls,
see Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 415 S.E.2d 906 (1992) discussed below.
218. See, e.g., Henry County - Sheriff; Clerk of the Superior Court; Judge of the Probate
Court; Tax Commissioner; Compensation, 1989 Ga. Laws 4824.
219. Hannah v. State, 212 Ga. 313, 321, 92 S.E.2d 89, 95 (1956), citing with approval
Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942) and interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 242813(8) now codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-16-10(8). See Appendix I.

